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1 Introduction
Klein and Leﬄer (1981) suggest a mechanism through which reputation may
provide the adequate incentive for sellers of experience goods to comply with
promises (e.g., supply high quality). If buyers pay a price premium for high
quality, if they are informed on past compliance and never buy from a seller
who cheated on quality in the past, the present value of the stream of future
profits granted by compliance may be higher than the one period deviation
gain that can be obtained by cheating consumers, so that the seller is in-
deed induced to be trustworthy. Shapiro (1983) formally investigates this
mechanism and shows that low and rising prices guarantee high quality in a
competitive market, because premiums for high quality ensure that no firm
has an incentive to cut on quality and cheat the market, but competition for
such premiums induces firms to set initially low, loss-making prices, which
correspond to an investment in reputation, to which later profits are the
normal market return.
The degree of market competition may be fundamental to determine in-
centives for high quality provision. Competition may both lower monopoly
rents, and thus reduce returns from promise compliance, and offer buyers
more alternatives, and thus strengthen punishments for non compliance.
Competition itself depends on entry and exit, which depend on expected
profits and therefore on returns to reputation and on reputation building
costs (besides standard entry and exit costs). If the number of entrants is
limited, strategic interaction, which is assumed away in competitive models
with infinitely many firms, is likely to play a major role.
This paper investigates how reputation works in a market in which the
number of firms is endogenous, quality is a long lasting choice variable and
low quality would not be bought (at profitable prices) if recognized as such.
Specifically, I consider a game with four stages: entry, quality selection (of
an experience good) and twice repeated market interaction (repetition allows
for reputation accumulation). I show that the intuition that low and rising
prices grant high quality provision extends to the present oligopolistic setting,
provided that high quality is sufficiently important for buyers.1
This work is related to the literature on price signals of quality, in which
1In a companion paper (Vanin, 2009), to which I refer for a deeper discussion of the
literature and of the model’s details, I show that, if high quality is less important to
buyers, then the reputation mechanism fails, giving rise to interesting market dynamics
with equilibrium cheating.
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market structure and quality are assumed as exogenously given.2 Yet it is
more closely related to the small recent literature that investigates reputa-
tion together with entry and quality choice.3 In particular, Ho¨rner (2002)
presents a dynamic version of Klein and Leﬄer (1981), in which firms en-
ter the market, choose quality every period and use prices to signal quality.
Each firm’s (quality guaranteeing) price rises over time (as its reputation in-
creases), until bad luck drives it out of the market. Consumers’ knowledge of
a firm’s customer base implies that it cannot raise its price to mimic higher
reputation firms. My assumption that buyers would not purchase low quality
at profitable prices under perfect information has the opposite implication
that upwards price mimicry is feasible. Indeed, it is often the case that buy-
ers ignore at the same time sellers’ quality and their customer base. Besides
for this aspect, the present work also differs from Ho¨rner (2002) because it
explicitly considers strategic interaction, rather than featuring a constant
continuous mass of firms on the market. Toth (2008) presents a dynamic
oligopoly model with stochastic entry and with investment in quality every
period, and shows that market concentration may alleviate moral hazard.
Yet his work is focused on firms’ survival contest and does not present an
explicit model of market interaction (in particular, prices are not used as sig-
nals of quality). My contribution consists precisely in providing an explicit
analysis of dynamic market interaction, allowing prices to serve as signals of
quality. Moreover, I also differ from these models in that I consider quality
as a long-lasting choice variable, which increases marginal costs, rather than
as a variable chosen made every period. To the extent that product quality
depends on the skills of a firm’s employees, as is the case in many service
markets, this view appears plausible and worth investigating.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model, Section 3 analyzes its equilibrium and Section 4 concludes. A
technical lemma is presented in Appendix.
2See, among others, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) for
monopoly; Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001), Fluet and Garella (2002), Yehezkel (2008)
and Daughety and Reinganum (2007) for duopoly; Daughety and Reinganum (2008) for
an n-firm oligopoly; and Allen (1984) and Cooper and Ross (1984) for competitive models
with U-shaped average cost function (I maintain the assumption of constant returns to
scale).
3Overgaard (1994) considers a monopolist with a potential entrant and Bester (1998)
investigates a duopoly with both quality and location choice on a line. My work is com-
plementary to the latter, because I endogenize the number of firms, taking as given the
degree of horizontal differentiation.
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2 Model
2.1 Structure
I consider a game with the following four-stage structure. At stage one an
infinite number of potential entrants simultaneously decide whether to enter
the market or not. Each entering firm pays a fixed entry cost ζ > 0, which is
sunk after entry, and chooses a different variety of an experience good. Vari-
eties are imperfect substitutes. The number of firms who enter the market is
denoted by n. At stage two the n firms on the market simultaneously choose
whether to produce high or low quality. The result of these choices is a vec-
tor z ∈ {0, 1}n, with zj = 1 meaning that firm j has chosen high quality.
Denote h =
∑n
j=1 zj the number of high quality firms. Once decided, the
quality level remains the same in the two following market stages. To sim-
plify and concentrate only on asymmetric information on consumers’ side, I
assume that, once chosen, a firm’s quality becomes known to all firms on the
market, but not to consumers. Consumers may learn a firm’s quality either
through direct experience with its products or by information extraction from
equilibrium price signals. At stage three firms and consumers interact on the
market for the first time. They move sequentially: first, firms simultaneously
choose prices, determining a price vector p1 ∈ Rn+. Next, having observed
p1, consumers (indeed, a representative consumer) decide how much to de-
mand to each firm, determining the demand vector q1 ∈ Rn+. Stage four is
analogous to stage three, but consumers now have additional information: if
they have consumed a positive quantity of a firm’s product, they are fully
informed about its quality. Again, first firms simultaneously choose prices
and determine the new price vector p2 ∈ Rn+ and then consumers choose the
new demand vector q2 ∈ Rn+.
2.2 Preferences and technology
Preferences are assumed in such a way as to generate a linear demand for
each product:4
4The model first presented by Shubik and Levitan (1980) and more recently used by
Motta (2004) is extended by allowing for imperfect observability and product-specific
quality, yielding the following expected utility function: U(q, e) =
∑n
j=1 α(ej)qj −
n
2(1+µ)
[∑n
j=1 q
2
j +
µ
n
(∑n
j=1 qj
)2]
. See Vanin (2009) for a derivation of (1).
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qj(p, e, n) =
1
n
{[
n+ µ(n− 1)
n
]
[α(ej)− pj]− µ
n
∑
i 6=j
[α(ek)− pk]
}
, (1)
or, in matrix notation, q(p, e, n) = E(n) · [α(e)−p], where E(n) is an n×n
matrix with elements Eii(n) =
n+µ(n−1)
n2
and Eik(n) = − µn2 ; p is the price
vector; e ∈ [0, 1]n is a vector of beliefs, i.e., its elements are the probability
attributed by the representative consumer to the fact that each good is of
high quality, conditional on information about previous play of the game
(which I omit to write for notational simplicity): ej = Pr{zj = 1}; α(ej)
reflects the utility value attributed to good j’s expected quality, defined as
α(ej) = β + ejγ, where β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 are parameters: β captures
the value attributed to a unit of a low quality good and γ the additional
value of high over low quality; α(e) is the vector of α(ej)’s; µ ∈ [0,∞) is a
parameter capturing the degree of substitutability between different varieties;
y is a perfectly competitive outside good, introduced only to make partial
equilibrium analysis justified.
One feature of this model is that (at interior consumers’ choices) market
size, Q(p, e, n) ≡ ∑nj=1 qj(p, e, n) = 1n∑nj=1[α(ej) − pj] = α¯ − p¯, does not
depend upon either the degree of substitutability or the number of products,
but only upon average expected quality and average price.
In the special case in which all products are expected to be of the same
quality α(e) and have the same price p, individual demands are simply qj =
α(e)−p
n
. Identical firms with constant returns to scale and marginal cost c <
α(e) react to this demand by setting the Nash equilibrium price
pE(n, e, c) =
nα(e) + [n+ µ(n− 1)]c
2n+ µ(n− 1) , (2)
which is increasing in e and c, decreasing in n and µ, converges to c as µ→∞
and further simplifies to the usual monopoly price α(e)+c
2
if n = 1.
To later consider deviations from equilibrium, notice that if firm j man-
ages to convince consumers that it is the only one offering high quality, i.e.,
if ej = 1 and ∀i 6= j, ei = 0, then ∀n > 0 and ∀p such that pj < α(1)
and pi ≥ α(0) ∀i 6= j, it holds that qj(p, e, n) = 1+µn+µ [α(1) − pj] and
∀i 6= j, qi(p, e, n) = 05.
5The reason why firm j’s demand depends on n is that, although j is the only one
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All goods are produced with a constant returns to scale technology, with
higher quality being more expensive to produce. Marginal costs of low and
high quality are cL ≥ 0 and cH > cL, respectively. Firms are assumed to exit
the market whenever they expect non positive profits.
2.3 Equilibrium concept and parameter restrictions
I look for a pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (WPBE) of
the entire game and restrict attention to equilibria that are symmetric, in
the sense that all firms choosing the same quality also set the same price.
Since several equilibria are possible, depending on how consumers form qual-
ity expectations based on observed prices, and on how firms use prices to
signal (or hide) their quality, I restrict attention to a simple class of be-
lief functions (specified below), characterized by the fact that consumers
distrust price signals whenever they are easy to imitate, and to ‘invest-
ment in reputation’ introductory prices, by which high quality firms signal
their quality through initially low, loss-making prices, which are too low to
be profitably imitated by low quality firms. Two assumptions are main-
tained throughout the analysis and are introduced and discussed here. Let
γˆ ≡
[
µ2+6(1+µ)+(2+µ)
√
µ2+8(1+µ)
2(1+µ)
]
(cH − cL).6
Assumption 1. α(0) = cL
Assumption 2. γ ≥ γˆ
Under perfect information, Assumption 1, which equalizes the intrinsic
utility of low quality goods and their production cost, makes demand for low
quality goods insufficient even for the profitable entry of a single low quality
monopolist, since its demand would be positive only at prices strictly below
selling a positive quantity, it is not the only one initially on the market. Consumers are
‘tempted’ by the other goods, although they do not buy them: the presence of other firms
posting prices and offering their products reduces the marginal utility derived from j’s
good, so that j is able to sell at pj a lower quantity than it would, at the same price, if it
were alone on the market (i.e., if n = 1). Technically, only j’s FOC holds with equality,
whereas all the other ones hold with strict inequality (see Vanin, 2009). Notice that, given
n > 1 and p, j’s demand increases in µ, since a higher degree of substitutability reduces
consumers’ temptation from different goods.
6The technical origin of γˆ is made clear in the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
Notice that γˆ is unboundedly increasing both in µ and in (cH − cL).
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marginal cost. This implies that, under imperfect information, firms can
profitably produce goods only as long as they manage to convince consumers
of their high quality (or count to recoup initial losses in the future). It
also implies that separation (of high from low quality firms) through upward
distorted prices is impossible, because, if any price above cL were a credible
signal of high quality, it would be imitated by low quality firms, thus losing
its credibility.
Assumption 2 grants that, if high quality firms separate from low quality
ones by setting initial prices at cL, then future profits from repeated purchase
always compensate initial losses, thus making full high quality provision pos-
sible.7
If recognized as such, low quality firms leave the market, whereas high
quality firms stay on the market and price according to (2). This is reflected
in the full information equilibrium at stage 4. By the same logic, it is im-
possible that at stage 3 both high and low quality firms stay on the market
and set two different prices, thus being recognized as such. This justifies the
focus on beliefs that support equilibria with pooling prices. If high qual-
ity firms are able to separate themselves from low quality ones through low
prices, then the market dries up for low quality firms, and these are forced
out of the market, implying that nobody at stage 2 would choose low quality.
This is precisely what Assumption 2 grants. The effects of distrust and of
investment in reputation on quality choice are discussed in Propositions 1
and 2. Entry costs then determine the number of entrants, thus closing the
model and allowing to make comparative statics exercises (Proposition 3).
In what follows I make these ideas precise. I order firms on the market
by assigning lower indices to high quality ones. I start solving the model by
backward induction, establishing sequential rationality of strategies and de-
ferring to the end the consistency requirement between beliefs and strategies
along the equilibrium path of play.
7It also implies that γ > cH−cL, which, given Assumption 1, is equivalent to α(1) > cH ,
which ensures that high quality firms receive positive demand in equilibrium and also
makes high quality provision socially efficient.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Stage 4: second market interaction
When consumers choose demand in the last move before the game ends, they
are fully informed about the quality of goods on the market.8 All low quality
firms exit the market. High quality firms set prices, sell quantities and make
profits according to (3), (4) and (5), respectively:9
p2(h) =
hα(1) + [h+ µ(h− 1)]cH
2h+ µ(h− 1) , (3)
q2(h) =
h+ µ(h− 1)
h[2h+ µ(h− 1)] [α(1)− cH ], (4)
pi2(h) =
h+ µ(h− 1)
[2h+ µ(h− 1)]2 [α(1)− cH ]
2. (5)
3.2 Stage 3: first market interaction
At stage 3 (first market interaction) firms set prices p1, consumers observe
them, formulate beliefs on each firm’s quality and then choose demand.10
There exists no pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which,
along the equilibrium path of play, at stage 3 both high and low quality firms
are present on the market and set two different prices (one for each quality
level). If it existed, consumers would infer each firm’s quality and force low
quality firms out of the market. I therefore look for equilibria with pooling
introductory prices.
8Beliefs are e2j (p
1,q1,p2) = zj if q1j > 0 and I assume e
2
j = 0 if q
1
j = 0, to rule out the
possibility that a firm finds it optimal to produce only at stage 4. The superscript 2 is
due to the fact that beliefs are relevant only in the two stages of market interaction and
stage 4 is the second one.
9Notice that p2(h), q2(h) and pi2(h) are all decreasing functions of h.
10Strategies specify each firm’s introductory price after any possible n > 0 and z ∈
{0, 1}n, since this identifies any possible information set at which firms may be called
to set prices. While at stage 4 any collection of previous histories of play identifies a
proper subgame, this is not the case at stage 3, because, for any n, any price vector
p1 ∈ Rn+ identifies one information set for the representative consumer, independently of
z ∈ {0, 1}n.
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Beliefs
In order to study equilibria with pooling introductory prices, I restrict atten-
tion to a specific simple class of beliefs, which is especially likely to support
such equilibria: ∀n > 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}, ∀p1 ∈ Rn+, ∀e0 ∈ [0, 1],
e1j(p
1, e0) =

e0 , if ∃p1 ∈ (cL, α(1)) : ∀i, p1i = p1
1 , if pj ≤ cL
0 , otherwise
(6)
This means that, upon observing a pooling introductory price (in the
range of profitable prices for low quality firms), consumers receive no infor-
mation from price signals and do not revise their prior.11 If a firm’s price is
(weakly) lower than cL, then consumers conclude it must be a high quality
firm, since at such introductory price a low quality firm’s expected profits
would be (weakly) negative and it would exit the market. If different prices
are observed on the market, consumers interpret any price, at which low
quality firms could make profits, as a trial to cheat them, and hence expect
low quality.
In summary, I am considering an environment in which consumers do not
trust price signals, because they are too easy to imitate, unless they convey
the information that a firm is indeed willing to incur losses to build a good
reputation, losses that low quality firms could never recoup.
Introductory prices, quantities and profits
I consider each firm’s strategy as specifying an introductory price function of
the form p1(n, h, e0). When all potential entrants adopt the same p1(n, h, e0),
I call it a pooling introductory price function.12
Given a pooling introductory price function p1(n, h, e0), if at any stage
3 information set it happens that p1 < α(e1), where p1 = p1(n, h, e0) and
11I interpret the prior e0 as the degree of consumers’ initial trust in firms’ product
quality, which is assumed to be common knowledge. Although introducing a prior is not
necessary (only equilibrium beliefs matter), it is useful to relate the present work to the
existing literature.
12In this case consumers’ quality expectations at stage 3 are the same for all firms and,
using (6), can be written as e1(p1, e0), where p1 = p1(n, h, e0). Notice that to study
equilibria with pooling introductory prices, it is enough to summarize z through h. This
will imply some slight abuse of language when talking about firms’ stage 3 information
sets. Such imprecisions are immaterial to the analysis and simplify the exposition.
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e1 = e1(p1, e0), then each firm j on the market expects to receive demand
q1(p1, e1, n) according to (1) , so that initial profits for low and high quality
firms are pi1L(p
1, e1, n) and pi1H(p
1, e1, n), respectively, where
q1(p1, e1, n) =
α(e1)− p1
n
, (7)
pi1L(p
1, e1, n) = (p1 − cL) · q1(p1, e1, n), (8)
pi1H(p
1, e1, n) = (p1 − cH) · q1(p1, e1, n), (9)
Overall profits
From equations (5), (6), (8), (9), letting again p1 = p1(n, h, e0) and e1 =
e1(p1, e0), define low and high quality firms’ overall expected profits at a pool-
ing price p1 < α(e1) as piL(n, h, p
1, e1) ≡ pi1L(p1, e1, n) and piH(n, h, p1, e1) ≡
pi1H(p
1, e1, n)+pi2(h), respectively.13 If n > 1, denote a firm’s overall deviation
profits, if it sets p 6= p1 when all other firms set p1, as pi′L(n, h, p, p1, e′) and
pi′H(n, h, p, p
1, e′), for a low and a high quality firm respectively, where e′ is
still derived from (6), but taking into account that the deviating firm prices
at p and all the other ones price at p1. In particular, if n ≥ h > 0, e0 > 0
and p1 > cL, then by deviating to p = cL, a high quality firm earns overall
deviation profits pi′H(n, h, cL, p
1, 1) = −(cH − cL)
(
1+µ
n+µ
)
γ + pi2(1).
Sequential rationality
To be part of a WPBE, a pooling introductory price function must be se-
quentially rational. In particular, it must specify a sequentially rational
price for a monopolist, but this restricts the initial levels of trust, for which
we may find sequentially rational pooling introductory price functions, to
e0 ∈ {0} ∪
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
.14 Given this, necessary and sufficient conditions for a
pooling price function to be sequentially rational are stated in Lemma 1 in
Appendix.
13At any price p1 ≥ α(e1), any firm receives zero demand and expects zero overall
profits: in this case, let piL(n, h, p1, e1) = 0 and piH(n, h, p1, e1) = 0.
14If a high quality monopolist sets p1 ≥ α(e0), it receives zero demand and makes zero
overall profits. This is not sequentially rational, because there exists an introductory price
p ∈ (cL, α(e0)), sufficiently close to α(e0), which grants strictly positive overall profits. In
turn, ∀p1 < α(e0), ∃ p ∈ (p1, α(e0)), which grants strictly lower initial losses and the same
future profits, and hence strictly higher overall profits.
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Under Assumptions 1 and 2, pricing at the initially loss making price cL
is profitable for high quality firms. Although any pooling introductory price
p1 ∈ (cL, α(1)) is strictly preferred by all firms to an equilibrium in which
they initially pool on p1 = cL, it holds that, whenever h and n are high, the
only sequentially rational pooling introductory price is precisely p1 = cL. The
reason is that the temptation to monopolize future gains is so high, that any
high quality firm would deviate from a profitable pooling introductory price
and would rather incur the initial losses necessary to grant future monopoly,
thus creating a sort of Prisoner’s Dilemma situation.15,16 I therefore focus on
an ‘investment in reputation’ pooling introductory price function, denoted
p1R(n, h, e
0), and such that ∀n > 1, ∀h ∈ {0, . . . , n}, p1R(n, h, e0) = cL.
From Lemma 1 in Appendix it then follows that this function is sequen-
tially rational, given beliefs (6), if and only if e0 ∈ {0} ∪
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
and, in
case of monopoly, it specifies p1R(1, 1, 0) = cL; ∀e0 ∈ (0, 1], p1R(1, 1, e0) =
pE(1, e0, cH); ∀e0 ∈ [0, 1], p1R(1, 0, e0) = pE(1, e0, cL).
3.3 Stage 2: quality choice
At stage 2 the n firms on the market simultaneously choose whether to spe-
cialize their technology to produce high or low quality goods. This choice
determines whether their marginal cost in the two subsequent periods will
be cH or cL, respectively. Indeed, firms’ strategies must specify such quality
choice at any possible stage 2 information set. This yields a sequence of
quality choice profiles z(n, e0). The following two propositions show that in
equilibrium such sequences imply that all firms on the market choose high
quality if either consumers have zero trust (e0 = 0) or if firms are going to
invest in reputation (price according to p1R(n, h, e
0)).
Proposition 1. (distrust grants high quality with low and rising
15Formally, ∀h > 1, ∀e0 ∈ [0, 1] and for any pooling introductory price function
p1(n, h, e0), ∃ n¯(h, e0) < ∞ such that, if p1(n, h, e0) is sequentially rational, then it must
specify, ∀n > n¯(h, e0), p1(n, h, e0) = cL. This follows from Lemma 1 in Appendix, since
for any h > 1 and e0 ∈ [0, 1], as n diverges, the LHS in (10) converges to zero, whereas
the RHS remains bounded away from zero.
16In Vanin (2007) I show that, if either γ or µ are sufficiently high, then the most intuitive
pooling introductory price function (which has high quality firms setting the price that is
most profitable for them, given that low quality firms mimic it) is sequentially rational
only if oligopolists always invest in reputation (that is, for any n > 0 and h ≤ n, and not
just when h and n are high).
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prices)
If e0 = 0, then at any WPBE supported by beliefs (6), at which n > 0 firms
enter the market, all of them choose high quality and subsequently set p1 = cL
and p2 = p2(n) > cL.
Proof. Given Assumptions 1 and 2 and beliefs (6) with e0 = 0, a low quality
firm expects to make zero profits at any sequentially rational introductory
price (i.e., at any p1 ≥ cL); a high quality firm has a unique sequentially
rational introductory price, p1 = cL, by setting which it grants itself strictly
positive profits. Thus all firms choose high quality. Equilibrium pricing
strategies must specify, ∀(n, h) : n > 0, n ≥ h ≥ 0 (i.e., both on and off the
equilibrium path of play), p2 = p2(n), p1 = cL if h > 0, and p
1 ≥ cL if h = 0.
Along the equilibrium path of play, if n > 0, then h = n implies p1 = cL and
p2 = p2(n).
Proposition 1 confirms the result obtained by Shapiro (1983), that con-
sumer’s initial distrust forces firms to offer high quality at prices that are
initially below marginal cost, since they have to invest in reputation, in or-
der to later price above marginal cost, when the initial investment pays off.
Yet in Shapiro’s equilibrium consumers are not fully rational, since their ini-
tial expectations turn out to be on average wrong. In contrast, under the
present distinction between initial trust and posterior beliefs, consumers’ dis-
trust forces high quality firms to lower their initial price to a level that is
unprofitable for low quality ones, thus convincing consumers of their high
quality. So initial distrust is reconciled with correct equilibrium quality ex-
pectations.
Notice that for e0 = 0 implies that for any n > 0 and h ∈ {0, . . . , n}, it
holds that p1R(n, h, e
0) = cL. Therefore Proposition 1 can be read as stating
that the strategy of investing in reputation succeeds in granting high quality
when buyers distrust sellers’ price signals. The next proposition extends the
result to the case of higher initial trust.
Proposition 2. (full high quality with investment in reputation)
If e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
and firms price according to p1R(n, h, e
0) at stage 3 and play
the Nash equilibrium at stage 4, then a sequence of quality choice profiles is
sequentially rational, given beliefs (6), if and only if all firms entering the
market choose high quality.
Proof. Denote overall expected profits for firms investing in reputation
piRi (n, h, e
0) ≡ pii (n, h, p1R(n, h, e0), e1(p1R(n, h, e0), e0)), for i ∈ {L,H}. Let
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n > 1. Since ∀h ∈ {0, . . . , n}, p1R(n, h, e0) = cL, Assumptions 1 and 2
imply that for h > 0, piRH (n, h, e
0) > piRL (n, h− 1, e0) = 0; and for h <
n, piRL (n, h, e
0) = 0 < piRH (n, h+ 1, e
0). Now let n = 1. Since p1R(1, 1, e
0) =
pE(1, e0, cH) and p
1
R(1, 0, e
0) = pE(1, e0, cL), we have that pi
R
H (1, 1, e
0) >
piRL (1, 0, e
0) ⇐⇒ e0 < cH−cL
γ
+ [α(1)−cH ]
2
(cH−cL)γ , which always holds under As-
sumptions 1 and 2, because they imply [α(1)−cH ]
2
(cH−cL)γ > 1.
Not surprisingly, Proposition 2 shows that choosing high quality is the
only sequentially rational choice for firms that are going to invest in reputa-
tion, since, anticipating that they are going to set low introductory prices,
which are not profitable for low quality firms, it would be inconsistent to
choose low quality.
3.4 Stage 1: entry and consistency
At stage 1 firms decide whether to enter the market or not. Since, overall
expected profits are decreasing in n, the sequentially rational number of
entrants is uniquely determined as the highest integer such that each firm’s
overall expected profits are higher than the fixed entry cost ζ.
At a WPBE beliefs must be consistent with strategies along the equilib-
rium path of play. Whenever equilibrium introductory pooling prices imply
that posterior beliefs are determined by initial trust, consistency imposes
equality in equilibrium between trust and average expected quality. Yet, if
along the equilibrium path of play all firms choose high quality and set the
introductory price p1 = cL, then consistency places no restrictions on the
initial value of e0.17
Proposition 3. (equilibrium and comparative statics for high γ)
The strategy profile (n, h(n), p1R(n, h, e
0)), together with the unique Nash equi-
librium at stage 4 and with beliefs (6), is a WPBE if and only if (i) e0 ∈
{0} ∪
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, (ii) h = n, (iii) p1 = cL, (iv) p
2 = p2(n), and (v) n is
the highest natural number such that equilibrium profits exceed entry costs,
piH(n, n, cL, 1) =
(cL−cH)γ
n
+ [n+µ(n−1)][α(1)−cH ]
2
[2n+µ(n−1)]2 ≥ ζ.18
The equilibrium number of firms has the following properties.
17The only restrictions on e0 come from the requirement that introductory prices are
sequentially rational at any information set, on and off the equilibrium path of play.
18To be precise, this statement must be qualified by specifying that e0 = 0 if
ζ ∈
(
(cL−cH)γ
2 +
(1+µ)[α(1)−cH ]2
(2+µ)2 , (cL − cH)γ + [α(1)−cH ]
2
4
]
, whereas e0 = 1 if ζ ∈
13
1. If ζ ≤ (1+µ)[α(1)−cH ]2
(2+µ)2
, then n =∞.19
2. If ζ ∈
(
(1+µ)[α(1)−cH ]2
(2+µ)2
, (cL−cH)γ
2
+ (1+µ)[α(1)−cH ]
2
(2+µ)2
]
, then 2 ≤ n < ∞ and
n is increasing in γ and decreasing in µ and (cH − cL).
3. If ζ ∈
(
(cL−cH)γ
2
+ (1+µ)[α(1)−cH ]
2
(2+µ)2
, [α(1)−cH ]
2
2
]
, then n = 1.
4. If ζ > [α(1)−cH ]
2
2
, then all markets are closed.
Proof. Property (i) follows from sequential rationality of a monopolist’s in-
troductory price; (ii) follows from Propositions 1 and 2; point (iii), with the
appropriate qualification in footnote, from the definition of p1R(n, h, e
0) and
from Lemma 1 in Appendix; (iv) from stage 4 Nash equilibrium; point (v)
and the subsequent results from simple algebra.
In words, the number of entrants is decreasing in entry costs, and it passes
from infinity to zero as ζ rises. Moreover, it is increasing in the utility differ-
ence between high and low quality, γ, and decreasing in their cost difference,
(cH − cL), as well as in the degree of substitutability of different varieties,
µ. Whenever markets are open, all firms choose high quality, and whenever
they compete with other firms, they invest in reputation, initially pricing
at low quality firms’ marginal cost and then raising prices at their perfect
information optimum. Given this pricing strategy, consistency of consumers’
beliefs does not impose any restriction on their initial trust level, except for
the particular case in which entry costs are so high that just a monopolist
enters the market. In all other cases, firms’ low introductory prices convince
consumers that quality is high, independently of initial trust. This is in
line with Shapiro (1983), who shows that at a competitive equilibrium firms
signal product quality through low and rising prices.
4 Conclusion
I have displayed a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endoge-
nously decide whether to enter the market and whether to specialize on high(
(cL − cH)γ + [α(1)−cH ]
2
4 ,
[α(1)−cH ]2
2
]
, in which case p1 = p2 = p2(1).
19Then p2 = limn→∞ p2(n) =
α(1)+(1+µ)cH
2+µ .
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or low quality products, and then repeatedly interact to sell experience goods
to consumers, who are able to precisely discover a firm’s product quality only
after the first purchase, but who are sufficiently rational to form correct ex-
pectations about average market quality. Although introductory prices may
be used as signals of quality, consumers do not trust them if such signals are
too easy to imitate. This creates a strong incentive for firms to pool on the
same introductory price, independently of their quality. If high quality is
sufficiently important to buyers, then all firms entering the market specialize
on high quality and set initially low and rising prices. Profits from repeated
purchase then more than compensate initial losses, and the reputation mech-
anism assures compliance with quality promises.
This result has been derived under the assumption that low quality prod-
ucts cannot be profitably sold under perfect information. This makes sep-
aration through high prices impossible, because for low quality sellers it is
always profitable to mimic such prices.20 Relaxing this assumption, equilib-
ria in which high and decreasing prices grant high quality might emerge, as
well as equilibria in which different qualities co-exist in the market and are
recognized as such. Although conceptually straightforward, the analysis of
such equilibria poses new technical subtleties, which require a separate work.
An analogous argument applies to the assumption that the utility differ-
ence between high and low quality is much higher than the cost difference,
so that low introductory prices constitute a profitable investment in repu-
tation, independently of the degree of market competition. In a companion
paper (Vanin, 2009) I show that, when high quality is not much more valu-
able to buyers than more costly to firms, the reputation mechanism fails and
the four stage game considered here yields interesting market dynamics with
equilibrium cheating. The analysis of the intermediate case, in which invest-
ing in reputation may be profitable when competition is low but not when
it is high, would make derivation and presentation of results unnecessarily
cumbersome, without adding much to intuition. It is to be expected that,
if entry costs are low and the equilibrium number of entrants is high, then
the reputation mechanism would fail, yielding equilibrium cheating by some
firms; in turn, if entry costs are high and the equilibrium number of entrants
is low, results would resemble those obtained here.
20This, in turn, makes consumers skeptical when they observe different market prices,
unless such prices are so low that they cannot be profitably imitated by low quality firms.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. (seq. rational pooling introductory price functions)
A pooling introductory price function p1(n, h, e0) is sequentially rational given
beliefs (6), with e0 ∈ {0} ∪
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, if and only if it satisfies the following
conditions.21
1. ∀n > 0, ∀h ∈ {0, . . . , n}, p1(n, h, e0) ≥ cL and,
if h > 0 and e0 = 0, then p1(n, h, e0) = cL.
2. ∀e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, p1(1, 0, e0) = pE(1, e0, cL) and p
1(1, 1, e0) = pE(1, e0, cH).
3. ∀n > 1, ∀h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, p1(n, h, e0) < α(e0) and,
if h > 1 and p1(n, h, e0) ∈ (cL, α(e0)), then
[p1(n, h, e0)− cH ]
{
e0γ − [p1(n, h, e0)− cL]
n
}
+ (cH − cL)
(
1 + µ
n+ µ
)
γ
≥
{
1
4
− h+ µ(h− 1)
[2h+ µ(h− 1)]2
}
[γ − (cH − cL)]2. (10)
Proof. Notice first that, given Assumption 1, Assumption 2 can be equiva-
lently re-written in one of the following ways: γ ≥ γˆ ⇐⇒ ∀n > 0, ∀h ∈
{1, . . . , n}, piH(n, h, cL, 1) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ∀n > 0, piH(n, n, cL, 1) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
limn→∞ piH(n, n, cL, 1) ≥ 0.22 Assumptions 1 and 2, together with beliefs (6),
imply that for any n > 1 and h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a high quality firm’s devia-
tion from p1(n, h, e0) > cL to p = cL yields strictly positive overall expected
profits pi′H(n, h, cL, p
1(n, h, e0), 1) > 0.
1. If, for some n > 0 and h ∈ {0, . . . , n}, p1(n, h, e0) < cL, then at the
corresponding information set any firm would strictly gain by deviating
to p = cL. Under beliefs (6) and Assumption 1, e
0 = 0 implies that
demand is positive if and only if p1(n, h, 0) ≤ cL. Given Assumption 2,
in turn, ∀n > 0, ∀h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, piH(n, h, cL, 1) > 0.
21In the cases not explicitly considered no additional constraints are imposed. See Vanin
(2007) for a generalization of this lemma outside Assumption 2.
22The precise expression of γˆ comes from this last version.
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2. Given Assumption 1, e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
is equivalent to α(e0) > cH and
therefore implies α(e0) > cL. In this case, under beliefs (6) a low quality
monopolist faces exogenous quality expectations e0, whatever price it
may choose in the interval (cL, α(e
0)). Only if it chooses its optimal
monopoly price in this interval, no profitable deviations are possible.
For a high quality monopolist, an analogous argument applies.
3. When several firms initially enter the market and a pooling introduc-
tory price p1(n, h, e0) ≥ cL is expected, low quality ones have no prof-
itable deviations. Any high quality firm (h > 0) may guarantee it-
self zero overall expected profits through a deviation to p > cL; if it
deviates from p1(n, h, e0) > cL to p ≤ cL, it monopolizes the mar-
ket at both stages 3 and 4, but it makes initial losses (so that the
best such deviation is to p = cL). Assumptions 1 and 2, together
with beliefs (6), imply that, given e0 > 0, a pooling introductory price
p1(n, h, e0) ≥ α(e0) is not sequentially rational, because it yields zero
overall expected profits and high quality firms would gain by devi-
ating to p = cL. A pooling price p
1(n, h, e0) ∈ (cL, α(e0)), in turn,
is sequentially rational if and only if piH(n, h, p
1(n, h, e0), e0) ≥ 0 and
piH(n, h, p
1(n, h, e0), e0) ≥ pi′H(n, h, cL, p1(n, h, e0), 1). The former in-
equality holds for any n > 1 and h > 0, because e0 > 0 and p1 ∈
(cL, α(e
0)) imply that piH(n, h, p
1, e0) > piH(n, h, cL, 1) ≥ 0. If h = 1,
the second inequality also holds for any n > 1 and e0 > 0, because by
deviating from p1 ∈ (cL, α(e0)) to p = cL, the high quality firm would
simply worsen its initial losses (or start to make them) without any fu-
ture benefit. In turn, if h > 1, then initial deviation losses might pay off
in the future (in terms of reduced competition), so that sequential ra-
tionality requires piH(n, h, p
1(n, h, e0), e0) ≥ pi′H(n, h, cL, p1(n, h, e0), 1),
which is is equivalent to condition (10).
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